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Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging

MARC

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520 |a This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer customized contracts that are closely tailored to manage specific risk and improve hedging efficiency. On the other hand, involvement in hedging may give rise to manipulation through misstatement of the value estimates. We show that the use of privately-observed hedging may actually require greater pay-for-performance in managerial compensation. The cross-sectional variations in managerial compensation lend support to our model 
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author Liu, Qi
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contents This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer customized contracts that are closely tailored to manage specific risk and improve hedging efficiency. On the other hand, involvement in hedging may give rise to manipulation through misstatement of the value estimates. We show that the use of privately-observed hedging may actually require greater pay-for-performance in managerial compensation. The cross-sectional variations in managerial compensation lend support to our model
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spelling 1\p Liu, Qi (DE-588)1012536769 (DE-627)661570975 (DE-576)345559223 aut, Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging, [S.l.] SSRN [2016], 1 Online-Ressource (19 p), Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, FRB International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1160, Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2016-03 erstellt, Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 unrestricted online access, This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer customized contracts that are closely tailored to manage specific risk and improve hedging efficiency. On the other hand, involvement in hedging may give rise to manipulation through misstatement of the value estimates. We show that the use of privately-observed hedging may actually require greater pay-for-performance in managerial compensation. The cross-sectional variations in managerial compensation lend support to our model, 2\p Sun, Bo (DE-588)1016627351 (DE-627)671003674 (DE-576)352520094 oth, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757874 X:ELVSSRN Verlag kostenfrei, 1 cgwrk 20241001 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk, 2 cgwrk 20241001 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757874 LFER, LFER epn:4219400494 2022-11-25T08:05:14Z
spellingShingle Liu, Qi, Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging, This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer customized contracts that are closely tailored to manage specific risk and improve hedging efficiency. On the other hand, involvement in hedging may give rise to manipulation through misstatement of the value estimates. We show that the use of privately-observed hedging may actually require greater pay-for-performance in managerial compensation. The cross-sectional variations in managerial compensation lend support to our model
title Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging
title_auth Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging
title_full Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging
title_fullStr Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging
title_full_unstemmed Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging
title_short Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging
title_sort managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging
title_unstemmed Managerial Compensation Under Privately-Observed Hedging
url https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757874
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