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|a Banks and Managerial Discipline
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|a This paper examines the impact of performance, board independence, and regulatory evaluations on CEO turnover in a recent sample of banks. Similar to earlier studies, the results suggest weak performance and greater board independence are positively related to CEO turnover. In addition, poor regulatory ratings and recent rating downgrades are found to have a positive impact on turnover, not fully explained by performance or board characteristics. Finally, the relation between CEO turnover and weak regulatory evaluations is only significant for banks with more independent boards. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that regulatory monitoring enhances managerial discipline in banks but that such discipline may be severely limited in banks with less independent boards
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This paper examines the impact of performance, board independence, and regulatory evaluations on CEO turnover in a recent sample of banks. Similar to earlier studies, the results suggest weak performance and greater board independence are positively related to CEO turnover. In addition, poor regulatory ratings and recent rating downgrades are found to have a positive impact on turnover, not fully explained by performance or board characteristics. Finally, the relation between CEO turnover and weak regulatory evaluations is only significant for banks with more independent boards. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that regulatory monitoring enhances managerial discipline in banks but that such discipline may be severely limited in banks with less independent boards |
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In: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Volume 51, Issue 1, February 2011, Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 4, 2010 erstellt |
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Palvia, Ajay A. aut, Banks and Managerial Discipline Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role?, [S.l.] SSRN [2013], 1 Online-Ressource (37 p), Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, In: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Volume 51, Issue 1, February 2011, Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 4, 2010 erstellt, Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 unrestricted online access, This paper examines the impact of performance, board independence, and regulatory evaluations on CEO turnover in a recent sample of banks. Similar to earlier studies, the results suggest weak performance and greater board independence are positively related to CEO turnover. In addition, poor regulatory ratings and recent rating downgrades are found to have a positive impact on turnover, not fully explained by performance or board characteristics. Finally, the relation between CEO turnover and weak regulatory evaluations is only significant for banks with more independent boards. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that regulatory monitoring enhances managerial discipline in banks but that such discipline may be severely limited in banks with less independent boards, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571209 X:ELVSSRN Verlag kostenfrei, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571209 LFER, LFER epn:4203939844 2022-10-30T19:14:52Z |
| spellingShingle |
Palvia, Ajay A., Banks and Managerial Discipline: Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role?, This paper examines the impact of performance, board independence, and regulatory evaluations on CEO turnover in a recent sample of banks. Similar to earlier studies, the results suggest weak performance and greater board independence are positively related to CEO turnover. In addition, poor regulatory ratings and recent rating downgrades are found to have a positive impact on turnover, not fully explained by performance or board characteristics. Finally, the relation between CEO turnover and weak regulatory evaluations is only significant for banks with more independent boards. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that regulatory monitoring enhances managerial discipline in banks but that such discipline may be severely limited in banks with less independent boards |
| title |
Banks and Managerial Discipline: Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role? |
| title_auth |
Banks and Managerial Discipline Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role? |
| title_full |
Banks and Managerial Discipline Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role? |
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Banks and Managerial Discipline Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role? |
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Banks and Managerial Discipline Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role? |
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Banks and Managerial Discipline |
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banks and managerial discipline does regulatory monitoring play a role? |
| title_sub |
Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role? |
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Banks and Managerial Discipline: Does Regulatory Monitoring Play a Role? |
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