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|a Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination
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|a I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastination of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present
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Su, Chih-Huei (Debby) |
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Su, Chih-Huei (Debby) |
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I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastination of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present |
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Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 25, 2015 erstellt |
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Su, Chih-Huei (Debby) aut, Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements, [S.l.] SSRN [2015], 1 Online-Ressource (30 p), Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 25, 2015 erstellt, Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 unrestricted online access, I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastination of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637194 X:ELVSSRN Verlag kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637194 X:ELVSSRN Resolving-System kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637194 LFER, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637194 LFER, LFER epn:4197761325 2022-10-16T16:11:42Z |
spellingShingle |
Su, Chih-Huei (Debby), Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements, I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastination of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present |
title |
Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements |
title_auth |
Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements |
title_full |
Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements |
title_fullStr |
Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements |
title_full_unstemmed |
Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements |
title_short |
Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination |
title_sort |
bank monitoring and managerial procrastination evidence from the timing of earnings announcements |
title_sub |
Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements |
title_unstemmed |
Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements |
url |
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637194, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637194 |
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