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Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements
| Authors and Corporations: | |
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| Title: | Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements |
| Language: | English |
| published: | |
| Item Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (30 p) ; Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 25, 2015 erstellt |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.2637194 |
| I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastination of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present |