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Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements

Authors and Corporations: Su, Chih-Huei (Debby) (Author)
Title: Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements
Language: English
published:
[S.l.] SSRN [2015]
Item Description: 1 Online-Ressource (30 p) ; Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 25, 2015 erstellt
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2637194
Description
I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastination of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present