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|a Equity-based compensation, while inducing greater managerial effort, also provides incentives for managers to fraudulently inflate a firm's stock price. This paper examines the owners' optimal contract in the face of these conflicting incentives when it is sometimes possible for the manager to commit fraud and the public disclosure of fraud harms the underlying value of the firm. The analysis shows that an increase in the likelihood of fraud can actually increase the attractiveness of equity compensation and the value of the firm. Ironically, while monitoring decreases the likelihood of fraud, it may indirectly increase the severity of fraud when fraud occurs
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Open Access |
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Robison, H. David |
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Santore, Rudy |
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Robison, H. David, Santore, Rudy |
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Robison, H. David |
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ZDB-33-SFEN, lfer |
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Equity-based compensation, while inducing greater managerial effort, also provides incentives for managers to fraudulently inflate a firm's stock price. This paper examines the owners' optimal contract in the face of these conflicting incentives when it is sometimes possible for the manager to commit fraud and the public disclosure of fraud harms the underlying value of the firm. The analysis shows that an increase in the likelihood of fraud can actually increase the attractiveness of equity compensation and the value of the firm. Ironically, while monitoring decreases the likelihood of fraud, it may indirectly increase the severity of fraud when fraud occurs |
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(DE-627)178151626X, (DE-599)KEP071361871, (OCoLC)1290313083, (ELVSSRN)770924, (EBP)071361871 |
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10.2139/ssrn.770924 |
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Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 20, 2008 erstellt |
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Robison, H. David aut, Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring, [S.l.] SSRN [2008], 1 Online-Ressource (36 p), Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 20, 2008 erstellt, Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 unrestricted online access, Equity-based compensation, while inducing greater managerial effort, also provides incentives for managers to fraudulently inflate a firm's stock price. This paper examines the owners' optimal contract in the face of these conflicting incentives when it is sometimes possible for the manager to commit fraud and the public disclosure of fraud harms the underlying value of the firm. The analysis shows that an increase in the likelihood of fraud can actually increase the attractiveness of equity compensation and the value of the firm. Ironically, while monitoring decreases the likelihood of fraud, it may indirectly increase the severity of fraud when fraud occurs, Santore, Rudy oth, https://ssrn.com/abstract=770924 X:ELVSSRN Verlag kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.770924 X:ELVSSRN Resolving-System kostenfrei, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.770924 LFER, https://ssrn.com/abstract=770924 LFER, LFER epn:4040561554 2022-01-21T09:11:32Z |
| spellingShingle |
Robison, H. David, Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring, Equity-based compensation, while inducing greater managerial effort, also provides incentives for managers to fraudulently inflate a firm's stock price. This paper examines the owners' optimal contract in the face of these conflicting incentives when it is sometimes possible for the manager to commit fraud and the public disclosure of fraud harms the underlying value of the firm. The analysis shows that an increase in the likelihood of fraud can actually increase the attractiveness of equity compensation and the value of the firm. Ironically, while monitoring decreases the likelihood of fraud, it may indirectly increase the severity of fraud when fraud occurs |
| title |
Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring |
| title_auth |
Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring |
| title_full |
Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring |
| title_fullStr |
Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring |
| title_short |
Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring |
| title_sort |
managerial incentives, fraud, and monitoring |
| title_unstemmed |
Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring |
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https://ssrn.com/abstract=770924, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.770924 |
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